OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-06-27 04:56
发布时间
2026-06-27 04:56
GitHub 审查时间
2026-06-27 04:56
NVD 发布时间
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源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-3p34-w4f6-5xh2/GHSA-3p34-w4f6-5xh2.json
A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the production static file server of better-helperjs (<= 3.0.5). Attackers can read arbitrary files located in adjacent directory structures that share the same string prefix as the intended static root directory.
The framework utilizes a custom static file server engine used when running in NODE_ENV=production (src/ssr/site-server.ts). Inside the safeStaticPath() method, the requested path is checked against the static root directory to prevent directory traversal out of the designated public folder.
However, the validation uses String.prototype.startsWith():
const root = path.resolve(rootDir);
const resolved = path.resolve(root, `.${decodedPath}`);
if (!resolved.startsWith(root)) {
return null;
}
This is logically flawed because startsWith evaluates plain strings rather than structural directory paths. If the application's assigned rootDir is /app/dist/client, and an attacker tries to access /app/dist/client-secrets/database.sqlite, the string "/app/dist/client-secrets/database.sqlite" successfully starts with "/app/dist/client".
Because of this bypass, an attacker can read sensitive files stored inside any adjacent directory traversing through the parent, as long as the adjacent directory name begins with the exact same prefix as the target public directory.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N<= 3.0.5>= 3.0.6To reproduce this locally on a vulnerable installation:
.dist/client directory.npm run build
mkdir -p dist/client-secrets
echo "EXPOSED_SECRET" > dist/client-secrets/secret.txt
NODE_ENV=production tsx server.ts)./../ paths (e.g., netcat or raw sockets), send a GET request spanning into the prefix-sharing adjacent folder:
GET /%2e%2e%2fclient-secrets/secret.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:4174
Connection: close
HTTP/1.1 200 OK exposing EXPOSED_SECRET.(Note: Developer environment npm run dev servers are immune as static requests are handled defensively by Vite's Dev Middlewares. This vulnerability only triggers upon production starts).
The path validation block has been updated to mandate exact path separation bounds by enforcing path.sep onto the evaluated traversal string.
// Enforces separator OR exact root matches preventing prefix extension
if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) && resolved !== root) {
return null;
}
If upgrading is temporarily impossible, users can safeguard their environment by ensuring no sensitive directories are deployed adjacent to their static build client directories sharing the identical word-prefix string.