django CMS: Broken access control in page *Duplicate* allows reading the content of any page (cross-site / restriction bypass)

Impact

The only authorization gate on the duplicate flow is PageAdmin.has_add_permission, which checks user_can_add_page(user, site) / user_can_add_subpage(...) — i.e. “may this user create a page at all”. Nothing checks the user’s relationship to the page being copied:

• cms/admin/forms.py — DuplicatePageForm.source = ModelChoiceField(queryset=Page.objects.all(), widget=HiddenInput()) spans every page in the database, on every site.
• cms/admin/forms.py — AddPageForm.__init__ returns early when the source widget is hidden, so the queryset is never narrowed to the user’s site/subtree.
• cms/admin/forms.py — AddPageForm.clean() validates only URL uniqueness; source is never validated against the user.
• cms/admin/pageadmin.py — duplicate() seeds source from the URL only on GET; on POST the value comes entirely from the request body.
• cms/admin/forms.py — AddPageForm.save() → from_source() performs source.copy(..., permissions=False) and copies every placeholder and all plugins of source into a new page on the attacker’s site. Because permissions=False drops the source’s view restrictions, the resulting copy is fully readable by the attacker.

This crosses a real privilege boundary: a staff user restricted (via CMS_PERMISSION) to their own site or subtree can exfiltrate the content of restricted pages and of pages belonging to other tenants.

Read-back is trivial (verified): the copy is created on the attacker’s site and, because copy(..., permissions=False) strips the source’s view restrictions, the new page is unrestricted. user_can_view_page() then returns True for it (unrestricted + PUBLIC_FOR), so the attacker — or even an anonymous visitor — can read the duplicated content directly from the front end. No further permission on the new page is required.