Affected Versions: @strapi/admin and @strapi/plugin-users-permissions <=5.33.2
How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to >=5.33.3
Description of CVE-2026-22706
In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied deviceId. When a password change or reset request did not include a deviceId, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active.
An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure.
The patch invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a deviceId is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response.
IoC's for CVE-2026-22706
Indicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:
Successful POST /api/auth/refresh or POST /admin/access-token requests using a refresh token issued before the user's most recent password change. Reviewable by correlating refresh-token iat claims against password-change events in audit logs
New access-token issuances for a user whose password was reset within the past 30 days, originating from an IP or User-Agent that did not perform the reset
Multiple active refresh tokens for a single user across distinct IPs after a password reset event
Database query: rows in strapi_session with created_at earlier than the user's most recent password-reset timestamp and
status = 'active'
References
OWASP ASVS 4.0 – V2.1.1: Session invalidation on credential change
OWASP Top 10 – A2: Broken Authentication
Credits
bugbunny.ai
AndyAnh174 (concurrent report, 2026-04-09 — originally filed as GHSA-c6gj-8rxm-jrf2, closed as duplicate)
Aastha2602 (concurrent report, 2026-03-10 — originally filed as GHSA-5qvg-4jch-gvf4, closed as duplicate)