OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-06-27 06:32
发布时间
2026-06-27 06:32
GitHub 审查时间
2026-06-27 06:32
NVD 发布时间
2026-06-20 05:17
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-j748-h363-wqj8/GHSA-j748-h363-wqj8.json
CVSSv4 Baseline Score: Low 2.4
CVSSv4 Weighted Score: Low 1.3
The full CVSSv4 Vector for this vulnerability is:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:H/IR:L/AR:L/MAV:N/MAC:H/MAT:P/MPR:L/MVC:L/MVI:N/MVA:N/MSC:L/MSI:N/MSA:N/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:L/U:Amber
CVSSv3.1 Baseline Score: Low 3.1
CVSSv3.1 Overall Score: Low 3.4
The full CVSSv3.1 Vector equivalent for this vulnerability is:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:P/RL:O/RC:C/CR:H/IR:L/AR:L/MAV:N/MAC:H/MPR:L/MUI:X/MS:U/MC:L/MI:N/MA:N
The weighted severity rating is a result of no indication this is currently being exploited being available at the time of the publish date, in addition to the fact it's unlikely that it is being exploited currently. The vectors have been picked based on the scenario most likely to exist in real configurations.
In addition to the weighting our assessment considers the fact the configuration scenario required for this vulnerability to be exploited is highly unlikely and an attacker is unlikely in most scenarios to be able to determine if the exploit is available and if it was successful except in rare situations. Though the visibility to the attacker was not reflected in our assessment.
Due to lack of canonicalization of domains in very specific edge cases an access control rule may be skipped when it should match a request.
This attack vector must be executed in a highly specific scenario which we do not believe any user would find themselves in. In an abundance of caution we are issuing this advisory and would appreciate any users who find this configuration report it to us with both the access control section, and sessions section so that we can best advise the community of the actual impact.
The specific conditions that could lead to a security issue for vulnerability are as follows:
a.b.example.comexample.com*.b.example.com and *.example.com i.e. wildcards, username matches, group matches.https://a.B.example.com and no other segment with capitalized letters.The kind of configuration used to produce this issue and result in a bypass rule being matched has long been highly discouraged. Essentially hosts which should be bypassed entirely should not be secured by having the proxy check them with the authorization handlers.
It should also be noted this has been heavily mitigated due to another bug where the session domain would not match if any part of the configured session domain was capitalized (fixed in https://github.com/authelia/authelia/commit/368631ecc5a9c6bcf2ff5f892ad443b890dd945e, it should be expressly noted this commit does not contain a fix for a CVE). This bug would prevent the request from succeeding in any way. This bug will also be fixed after this vulnerability is fixed, and the bug where session domains would not match has no security impact other than heavily mitigating the access control vulnerability.
Upgrade to 4.39.20.
See the below examples for configurations to avoid.
The following example could result in a 1FA downgrade.
Request URL: https://a.B.example.com
Configuration:
session:
cookies:
- domain: 'example.com'
authelia_url: 'https://example.com'
access_control:
rules:
- domain: '*.b.example.com'
policy: 'two_factor'
- domain: '*.example.com'
policy: 'one_factor'
The following example could result in a bypass downgrade. It should be noted that configurations like this have long been discouraged. The domains matching the pattern *.example.com should not be configured to forward authorization requests to Authelia in most situations.
Request URL: https://a.B.example.com
Configuration:
session:
cookies:
- domain: 'example.com'
authelia_url: 'https://example.com'
access_control:
rules:
- domain: '*.b.example.com'
policy: 'two_factor'
- domain: '*.example.com'
policy: 'bypass'
The following configuration is unaffected regardless of the request.
session:
cookies:
- domain: 'example.com'
authelia_url: 'https://example.com'
access_control:
rules:
- domain: 'b.example.com'
policy: 'two_factor'
- domain: '*.example.com'
policy: 'one_factor'