Kimai: Default APP_SECRET in Docker Image Enables Cookie Forgery and Account Takeover

Summary

The official Kimai Docker image ships with APP_SECRET=change_this_to_something_unique as the default environment variable. The Docker entrypoint does not override or validate this value. Any Kimai instance deployed using the Docker image without explicitly setting APP_SECRET runs with a publicly-known Symfony kernel.secret, enabling an unauthenticated attacker to forge HMAC-signed cookies and login links to take over any account including super_admin.

Details

Dockerfile:263 sets ENV APP_SECRET=change_this_to_something_unique. This value is consumed by config/packages/framework.yaml:7 as kernel.secret, which Symfony uses to HMAC-sign:

• The KIMAI_REMEMBER remember-me cookie
• LoginLink signatures
• Password reset URLs
• CSRF tokens

The .docker/entrypoint.sh does not check for or replace the default sentinel value. The bare-metal .env.dist:38 ships the same default. No startup-time guard exists anywhere in the codebase that refuses to start when APP_SECRET equals the sentinel.

User IDs are sequential integers starting from 1. The first super_admin account is almost always id=1. User IDs are visible in some URLs and API responses.

A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.

Impact

Any Kimai instance deployed via the official Docker image without overriding APP_SECRET can be compromised from the internet. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Kimai URL can forge authentication tokens and log in as any user if:

• a username is known AND
• the correct account ID for this username is guessed AND
• the account has no active 2FA (two factor) authentication

Solution

• The entrypoint.sh file is updated and now contains a script that generates a random APP_SECRET via bin2hex(random_bytes(32)) which will be stored in /opt/kimai/var/data/.appsecret
• The entrypoint.sh will create the file containing the , either fetched from the Docker Environment or from the newly created secret file