OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-07-29 23:17
发布时间
2026-07-29 23:17
GitHub 审查时间
2026-07-29 23:17
NVD 发布时间
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源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-jrmc-qg6p-94fp/GHSA-jrmc-qg6p-94fp.json
Description
A PostScript-interpreter-driven Denial of Service (CWE-1325) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to exhaust validator memory or CPU by submitting a PDF whose Type 0 font /Encoding (or any /ToUnicode) is a CMap stream containing attacker-supplied PostScript. veraPDF reuses its CMap parser as a general PostScript interpreter and exposes the unguarded array N allocation operator and the for control operator with no zero-increment guard. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-parser.
The vulnerability resides in veraPDF-parser. CMap streams referenced as a Type 0 font's /Encoding (or any font's /ToUnicode) are parsed by CMapParser (veraPDF-parser/src/main/java/org/verapdf/pd/font/cmap/CMapParser.java), which extends PSParser. Tokens that are not the small CMap-specific keyword set (begincodespacerange, bfchar, cidchar, ...) fall through to PSObject.execute (veraPDF-parser/src/main/java/org/verapdf/parser/postscript/PSObject.java), which dispatches generic PostScript operators implemented in PSOperator (veraPDF-parser/src/main/java/org/verapdf/parser/postscript/PSOperator.java).
Two operators in that interpreter take their bound from the PDF and apply no validation:
array at PSOperator.java:536-547 pops the top number from the operand stack and immediately calls COSArray.construct(arraySize), then loops arraySize times appending COSObject.getEmpty(). COSArray.construct(int) calls new ArrayList<>(arraySize) (COSArray.java:102), so the underlying Object[] is allocated up-front. Passing 2147483647 (Integer.MAX_VALUE) requests a 16 GB backing array on a 64-bit JVM.for at PSOperator.java:571-592 reads initial, increment, and limit from the stack and loops for (long i = initial; i <= limit; i += increment). Because is unchecked, produces an infinite-CPU spin (and progressively a heap exhaustion as each iteration pushes onto the operand stack).increment0 0 1 { } foriCMapFactory.getCMap only catches IOException and PostScriptException; it does not catch OutOfMemoryError or wall-clock budget, so the failure propagates out of font model construction and aborts the validation worker.
A single payload byte sequence, the unframed PostScript 2147483647 array, is sufficient. No begincmap/endcmap framing is required because the operator runs before the parser ever reaches the CMap structure.
This impacts all current releases of the veraPDF-parser. Successful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF; a single Type 0 font with a malicious /Encoding (or any /ToUnicode) stream is sufficient.
Cap array allocation and forbid zero increments in for.
As a defensive measure, also wrap CMapFactory.getCMap to enforce a wall-clock and operand-stack-size budget on CMap parsing, and audit the remaining unbounded operators (copy, roll, dict) for similar primitives.