OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-05-12 21:27
发布时间
2026-04-25 00:17
GitHub 审查时间
2026-04-25 00:17
NVD 发布时间
2026-05-08 12:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-jv9x-w4gm-hwcm/GHSA-jv9x-w4gm-hwcm.json
The Team API endpoints use #[IsGranted('edit_team')] instead of #[IsGranted('edit', 'team')], causing Symfony TeamVoter to abstain from voting. This removes entity-level ownership checks on team operations, allowing any user with the edit_team permission to modify any team, not just teams they are authorized to manage.
All 8 team association endpoints in src/API/TeamController.php (lines 177, 201, 229, 252, 275, 298, 321, 339) use #[IsGranted('edit_team')] with a single argument. The web controller at src/Controller/TeamController.php:118 correctly uses #[IsGranted('edit', 'team')] with two arguments, passing the $team parameter as the subject. When edit_team is passed as the attribute, TeamVoter::supportsAttribute() returns false because it only recognizes view, edit, and delete. The voter abstains entirely. Only RolePermissionVoter fires, which checks the role-level permission without any entity-level ownership validation.
curl -X POST https://TARGET/api/teams/1/members/2 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <API_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
In default configuration, only ROLE_ADMIN and ROLE_SUPER_ADMIN have edit_team, and both roles already have irrevocable view_all_data access, making the missing check redundant. The vulnerability becomes exploitable if an administrator grants edit_team to a lower-privilege role (such as ROLE_TEAMLEAD) through the permissions UI. In that scenario, the lower-privilege user could modify any team's membership, customer assignments, project assignments, and activity assignments without being a member or teamlead of that team.