OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-07-21 21:36
发布时间
2026-06-23 07:59
GitHub 审查时间
2026-06-23 07:59
NVD 发布时间
2026-06-25 05:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-p9f5-h3rx-j5qw/GHSA-p9f5-h3rx-j5qw.json
In Gogs 0.14.1, GET /attachments/:uuid returns the raw attachment file without verifying whether the requester has view permission for the associated Issue/Comment/Release or the repository.
In a test environment with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false, we confirmed that an unauthenticated user can download attachments belonging to a private repository.
/attachments/:uuid retrieves an attachment record solely by the UUID provided in the URL and returns the corresponding local file without performing any authorization checks against the attachment’s parent object (Issue/Comment/Release) or the repository it belongs to. As a result, even attachments under private repositories can be downloaded by an unauthenticated user (or a user without proper permissions) as long as the UUID is known.
Relevant code (internal/cmd/web.go:306):
m.Get("/attachments/:uuid", func(c *context.Context) {
attach, err := database.GetAttachmentByUUID(c.Params(":uuid"))
if err != nil {
c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get attachment by UUID")
return
} else if !com.IsFile(attach.LocalPath()) {
c.NotFound()
return
}
fr, err := os.Open(attach.LocalPath())
if err != nil {
c.Error(err, "open attachment file")
return
}
defer fr.Close()
c.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")
c.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public,max-age=86400")
c.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`inline; filename="%s"`, attach.Name))
if _, err = io.Copy(c.Resp, fr); err != nil {
c.Error(err, "copy from file to response")
return
}
})
The UUID lookup itself also performs no validation tied to repository visibility or user permissions. Authorization is not enforced at this layer.
Relevant code (internal/database/attachment.go:124):
// GetAttachmentByUUID returns attachment by given UUID.
func GetAttachmentByUUID(uuid string) (*Attachment, error) {
return getAttachmentByUUID(x, uuid)
}
[auth] REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = falseREQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true, exploitation may still be possible because the handler does not check repository-level permissions; a user who can log in but lacks access to the target repository may still retrieve the attachment.myadmin/idor-attach-1770724346-1a13bb.f06d90f8-5b62-4c10-ac8d-f11fdf870b57).The repository page → 404 Not Found
<img width="1702" height="758" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8fdb1d92-cfc3-4ef8-977e-60ec13f792df" />The Issue page under that repository → 404 Not Found
<img width="1983" height="546" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c44c5e69-8ca2-4ea6-a071-62302b7e896f" />GET /attachments/<uuid> → the attachment file is successfully downloaded
REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false: none (works without authentication).REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true: only the ability to log in (repository view permission is not required in practice).Confidential information attached to private repositories or restricted Issues/Releases may be disclosed.
While the severity depends on the attachment contents, attachments frequently contain sensitive data, making the potential impact high.