OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-07-20 20:33
发布时间
2026-05-29 23:59
GitHub 审查时间
2026-05-29 23:59
NVD 发布时间
2026-06-12 01:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-pjwm-pj3p-43mv/GHSA-pjwm-pj3p-43mv.json
shouldBypassProxy, introduced in v1.15.0 to fix CVE-2025-62718, does not normalise IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses. When NO_PROXY lists an IPv4 address such as 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254, a request URL using the IPv4-mapped IPv6 form (::ffff:7f00:1, ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe) still routes through the configured proxy. Node.js resolves these addresses to the underlying IPv4 host, so the request reaches the internal service via the proxy rather than being blocked.
lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js (v1.15.0):
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
// normalizeNoProxyHost strips brackets and trailing dots, but not ::ffff: prefix
return hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));
The WHATWG URL parser canonicalises http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/ to hostname [::ffff:7f00:1]. After bracket-stripping: ::ffff:7f00:1. This string does not match 127.0.0.1 in NO_PROXY and is not in LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES, so shouldBypassProxy returns false and the proxy is used. proxy-from-env (called before shouldBypassProxy) has the same gap - it does not equate ::ffff:7f00:1 with 127.0.0.1 - so neither layer catches the bypass.
// NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1,localhost,::1 HTTP_PROXY=http://attacker:8080
import shouldBypassProxy from 'axios/lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js';
// All three should return true (bypass proxy). Only the first two do.
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://127.0.0.1/')); // true [OK]
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://[::1]/')); // true [OK]
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/')); // false <- bypass
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://[::ffff:7f00:1]/')); // false <- bypass
Node.js routes ::ffff:7f00:1 to 127.0.0.1:
// net.connect({ host: '::ffff:7f00:1', port: 80 }) reaches a service
// bound to 127.0.0.1:80 — confirmed on Node.js v24, Linux and macOS.
Cloud metadata SSRF: ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe = ::ffff:169.254.169.254. If NO_PROXY=169.254.169.254 is set to block IMDS access, a request to http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/ bypasses it.
Canonicalise IPv4-mapped IPv6 in normalizeNoProxyHost before any comparison:
const ipv4MappedDotted = /^::ffff:(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/i;
const ipv4MappedHex = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
function hexToIPv4(a, b) {
const hi = parseInt(a, 16), lo = parseInt(b, 16);
return `${hi >> 8}.${hi & 0xff}.${lo >> 8}.${lo & 0xff}`;
}
const normalizeNoProxyHost = (hostname) => {
if (!hostname) return hostname;
if (hostname[0] === '[' && hostname.at(-1) === ']')
hostname = hostname.slice(1, -1);
hostname = hostname.replace(/\.+$/, '').toLowerCase();
let m;
if ((m = hostname.match(ipv4MappedDotted))) return m[1];
if ((m = hostname.match(ipv4MappedHex))) return hexToIPv4(m[1], m[2]);
return hostname;
};
Any application that sets NO_PROXY to exclude internal or metadata endpoints and uses an HTTP/HTTPS proxy can have those exclusions bypassed by a URL using IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation. The attacker must control the request URL. In cloud environments with instance metadata services, this can lead to credential exfiltration.