GHSA-R2F4-FF2P-XC64高危已审查

Pimcore Platform - SQL Injection in DataObject composite index handling during class definition import/save

OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-07-11 03:08

发布时间

2026-05-29 04:47

GitHub 审查时间

2026-05-29 04:47

NVD 发布时间

—

源文件

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64/GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64.json

公告说明

My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together.

As part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix.

We have reserved the CVE ID "CVE-2026-5394" for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons. We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you.

Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this.

Description

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

The vulnerable flow accepts compositeIndices from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX and ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX statements executed through Doctrine DBAL.

Although the original report focused on compositeIndices.index_key, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is compositeIndices.index_columns, because it is inserted verbatim inside the ADD INDEX (...) clause. This permits injection of additional ALTER TABLE subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries.

Vulnerability

Root cause

Source:

Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson() accepts compositeIndices directly from imported JSON.

Assignment:

Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices() does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names.
The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to __id and __type, which is not a security control.

Sink:

Pimcore\Model\DataObject\Traits\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices() builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via $this->db->executeQuery(...).

Missing protection:

quoteIdentifier() is used for the SHOW INDEXES query, but not for the dynamic ALTER TABLE statements.
No server-side schema validation restricts index_key or index_columns to known safe identifier characters.

Confirmed source-to-sink path

importClassDefinitionFromJson() decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards compositeIndices.
setCompositeIndices() stores those values without sanitizing identifier content.
ClassDefinition::save() reaches ClassDefinition\Dao::update().
Dao::update() calls updateCompositeIndices() for:
- object_store_<classId>
- object_query_<classId>
Localizedfield\Dao also calls updateCompositeIndices() for:
- localized query tables
- localized store tables

Why this is exploitable

The vulnerable ADD INDEX statement is built as:

'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'

$columnName is produced from implode(',', $columns) and is not quoted or validated. A malicious index_columns element such as:

slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` --

produces SQL of the form:

ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );

This remains a single ALTER TABLE statement, so the base vulnerability does not depend on multi-statement support. The attacker can inject additional DDL clauses affecting the target Pimcore object table.

The issue allows a privileged attacker to alter backend SQL behavior during class-definition import/save and modify schema on Pimcore object tables associated with the affected class.

Practical impact includes:

unauthorized schema modification on object query/store tables
backend denial of service by breaking expected table layout
data integrity impact for DataObject storage and queries

index_key is also concatenated into SQL without proper identifier escaping, but the most defensible exploitation path is through index_columns.

models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:92-137
models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:994-1006
models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php:30-85
models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:217-218
models/DataObject/Localizedfield/Dao.php:945-951

Application-level PoC

valid authenticated administrative session
ability to import or save a class definition containing compositeIndices

The original report reproduced the issue through an authenticated Studio endpoint:

POST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import

Minimal malicious JSON fragment:

{
  "compositeIndices": [
    {
      "index_key": "poc_idx",
      "index_type": "query",
      "index_columns": [
        "slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- "
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Authenticate as an administrator with permission to manage/import class definitions.
Export an existing class definition or prepare a valid class-definition JSON document.
Replace only the compositeIndices section with the payload above.
Import the modified definition or save the class through the administrative workflow.

Pimcore reaches updateCompositeIndices() during class save/import.
The backend executes an attacker-influenced ALTER TABLE statement against the target object table.
The affected class table is modified unexpectedly, for example by dropping a column or otherwise changing schema.

Minimal source-level confirmation

The behavior is directly visible from the code path:

$newIndicesMap['c_' . $key] = implode(',', $columns);
$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];
$this->db->executeQuery(
    'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'
);

No escaping or allowlist validation is applied to $columns before they are interpolated into SQL.

Evidence of Exploitation

Video of exploitation:

We have reserved the ID CVE-2026-5394 to refer to this issue from now on.

Pimcore Platform Version v12.3.3 Database layer: doctrine/dbal ^4.4 Operating System: Any

受影响的软件包

Packagist

pimcore/pimcore

ECOSYSTEM

引入12.0.0-RC1修复12.3.7

Packagist

pimcore/pimcore

ECOSYSTEM

引入0修复11.5.17

Packagist

pimcore/pimcore

ECOSYSTEM

引入2026.1.0修复2026.1.3

标识信息

别名 / CVE

CVE-2026-5394

CWE

CWE-89

软件生态

Packagist

扩展资料

暂无扩展资料。

CVSS 评分

CVSS_V4

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

原始 OSV JSON

{
  "id": "GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64",
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5394"
  ],
  "details": "My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together.\n\nAs part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix.\n\nWe have reserved the CVE ID **\"CVE-2026-5394\"** for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at [https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons](https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons). We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you.\n\nPlease feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this.\n\n## Description\nAn authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.\n\nThe vulnerable flow accepts `compositeIndices` from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into `ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX` and `ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX` statements executed through Doctrine DBAL.\n\nAlthough the original report focused on `compositeIndices.index_key`, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is `compositeIndices.index_columns`, because it is inserted verbatim inside the `ADD INDEX (...)` clause. This permits injection of additional `ALTER TABLE` subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries.\n\n## Vulnerability\n### Root cause\n1. Source:\n   - `Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson()` accepts `compositeIndices` directly from imported JSON.\n2. Assignment:\n   - `Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices()` does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names.\n   - The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to `__id` and `__type`, which is not a security control.\n3. Sink:\n   - `Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\Traits\\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices()` builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via `$this->db->executeQuery(...)`.\n4. Missing protection:\n   - `quoteIdentifier()` is used for the `SHOW INDEXES` query, but not for the dynamic `ALTER TABLE` statements.\n   - No server-side schema validation restricts `index_key` or `index_columns` to known safe identifier characters.\n\n### Confirmed source-to-sink path\n1. `importClassDefinitionFromJson()` decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards `compositeIndices`.\n2. `setCompositeIndices()` stores those values without sanitizing identifier content.\n3. `ClassDefinition::save()` reaches `ClassDefinition\\Dao::update()`.\n4. `Dao::update()` calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for:\n   - `object_store_<classId>`\n   - `object_query_<classId>`\n5. `Localizedfield\\Dao` also calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for:\n   - localized query tables\n   - localized store tables\n\n### Why this is exploitable\nThe vulnerable `ADD INDEX` statement is built as:\n\n```php\n'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'\n```\n\n`$columnName` is produced from `implode(',', $columns)` and is not quoted or validated. A malicious `index_columns` element such as:\n\n```text\nslider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- \n```\n\nproduces SQL of the form:\n\n```sql\nALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );\n```\n\nThis remains a single `ALTER TABLE` statement, so the base vulnerability does not depend on multi-statement support. The attacker can inject additional DDL clauses affecting the target Pimcore object table.\n\n### Impact\nThe issue allows a privileged attacker to alter backend SQL behavior during class-definition import/save and modify schema on Pimcore object tables associated with the affected class.\n\nPractical impact includes:\n- unauthorized schema modification on object query/store tables\n- backend denial of service by breaking expected table layout\n- data integrity impact for DataObject storage and queries\n\n`index_key` is also concatenated into SQL without proper identifier escaping, but the most defensible exploitation path is through `index_columns`.\n\nRelevant code:\n- `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:92-137`\n- `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:994-1006`\n- `models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php:30-85`\n- `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:217-218`\n- `models/DataObject/Localizedfield/Dao.php:945-951`\n\n## PoC\n### Application-level PoC\nPreconditions:\n- valid authenticated administrative session\n- ability to import or save a class definition containing `compositeIndices`\n\nThe original report reproduced the issue through an authenticated Studio endpoint:\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import\n```\n\nMinimal malicious JSON fragment:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"compositeIndices\": [\n    {\n      \"index_key\": \"poc_idx\",\n      \"index_type\": \"query\",\n      \"index_columns\": [\n        \"slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- \"\n      ]\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nReproduction:\n1. Authenticate as an administrator with permission to manage/import class definitions.\n2. Export an existing class definition or prepare a valid class-definition JSON document.\n3. Replace only the `compositeIndices` section with the payload above.\n4. Import the modified definition or save the class through the administrative workflow.\n\nExpected result:\n- Pimcore reaches `updateCompositeIndices()` during class save/import.\n- The backend executes an attacker-influenced `ALTER TABLE` statement against the target object table.\n- The affected class table is modified unexpectedly, for example by dropping a column or otherwise changing schema.\n\n### Minimal source-level confirmation\nThe behavior is directly visible from the code path:\n\n```php\n$newIndicesMap['c_' . $key] = implode(',', $columns);\n$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];\n$this->db->executeQuery(\n    'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'\n);\n```\n\nNo escaping or allowlist validation is applied to `$columns` before they are interpolated into SQL.\n\n## Evidence of Exploitation\n\n- Video of exploitation:\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/64a49147-12a5-4550-ba22-cb4383523557\n\n- Static evidence:\n\n<img width=\"3004\" height=\"1686\" alt=\"Dragons-img\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2e920636-ce7e-4f8b-b80c-88fb3c4c5299\" />\n\n## Our security policy\nWe have reserved the ID CVE-2026-5394 to refer to this issue from now on.\n\n[Disclosure policy](https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy)\n\n## System Information\nPimcore Platform\nVersion `v12.3.3`\nDatabase layer: `doctrine/dbal` `^4.4`\nOperating System: Any\n\n## References\nGithub Repository: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore\nSecurity: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security",
  "summary": "Pimcore Platform - SQL Injection in DataObject composite index handling during class definition import/save",
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.0.0-RC1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.3.7"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "package": {
        "name": "pimcore/pimcore",
        "ecosystem": "Packagist"
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 12.3.6"
      }
    },
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.5.17"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "package": {
        "name": "pimcore/pimcore",
        "ecosystem": "Packagist"
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 11.5.16"
      }
    },
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.1.3"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "package": {
        "name": "pimcore/pimcore",
        "ecosystem": "Packagist"
      }
    }
  ],
  "modified": "2026-07-10T19:08:01Z",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V4",
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-05-28T20:47:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64",
      "type": "WEB"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5394",
      "type": "ADVISORY"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/19108",
      "type": "WEB"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/6df625ff74015dc11f4bbe76170ce45bbd5dd61d",
      "type": "WEB"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://fluidattacks.com/es/advisories/dragons",
      "type": "WEB"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore",
      "type": "PACKAGE"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v12.3.7",
      "type": "WEB"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "severity": "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T20:47:10Z"
  }
}