OpenClaw: Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers

Summary

Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.

Mitigations

bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.