OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-08-26 22:10
发布时间
2026-08-26 22:10
GitHub 审查时间
2026-08-26 22:10
NVD 发布时间
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源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-vmm3-xgcx-67hm/GHSA-vmm3-xgcx-67hm.json
http4s 0.23.x and 1.0 servers running ember with http2 enabled are vulnerable to a denial of service attack using a HPACK bomb vulnerability recently disclosed as affecting other http2 servers.
Denial of Service:
The issue occurs in the Hpack wrapper. Ember concatenates the header and continuation frames before decoding all headers at once. When the code decodes the attack payload, the relatively small packets decode to a significantly larger amount of data which is returned as a single List which is then held in memory for further processing. With enough concurrent connections (~5 with a 2GB heap in testing) this leads to an OOM, eg:
java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.scala$collection$mutable$ListBuffer$$freshFrom(ListBuffer.scala:129)
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:147)
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:40)
at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq(Growable.scala:69)
at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq$(Growable.scala:69)
at scala.collection.mutable.AbstractBuffer.$plus$plus$eq(Buffer.scala:314)
at org.http4s.Header$.org$http4s$Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$_$$lessinit$greater$$anonfun$2(Header.scala:192)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$Lambda/0x00001fe001239c50.apply(Unknown Source)
at scala.collection.immutable.List.foreach(List.scala:334)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10.<init>(Header.scala:192)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$.scalaCollectionSeqToRaw(Header.scala:195)
at org.http4s.Headers$.apply(Headers.scala:220)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.PseudoHeaders$.headersToRequestNoBody(PseudoHeaders.scala:95)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream.receiveHeaders$$anonfun$1$$anonfun$2$$anonfun$3$$anonfun$2(H2Stream.scala:248)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream$$Lambda/0x00001fe001511fd8.apply(Unknown Source)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.runLoop(IOFiber.scala:429)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.autoCedeR(IOFiber.scala:1460)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.run(IOFiber.scala:129)
at cats.effect.unsafe.WorkerThread.run(WorkerThread.scala:935)
The Hpack handling code has a configurable max header size parameter, but it does not include indexed headers in that accounting, allowing the attack to bypass the limit. There is not any configuration available in current http4s versions that can be enabled to prevent this attack short of disabling http2.
A fix has been tested locally that threads the maxHeaderSize setting from the server builder into the Hpack code. Using this, connections can be prematurely terminated once the decoded data size exceeds the maxHeaderSize that users can already configure.
If you can't upgrade immediately: