OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-07-21 21:16
发布时间
2026-06-23 01:09
GitHub 审查时间
2026-06-23 01:09
NVD 发布时间
2026-06-25 05:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-w6j9-vw59-27wv/GHSA-w6j9-vw59-27wv.json
When ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION is enabled, Gogs accepts the configured authentication header (default: X-WEBAUTH-USER) directly from client requests without validating that the request originated from a trusted reverse proxy. Any remote attacker who can reach the Gogs service can forge this header to impersonate any user or trigger automatic account creation, completely bypassing authentication.
The vulnerability exists because Gogs reads the authentication header directly from the incoming HTTP request without any verification that the header was set by a trusted reverse proxy.
In internal/context/auth.go lines 206-234:
func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) {
// ... existing auth checks ...
if uid <= 0 {
if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication {
// Reads header DIRECTLY from client request - NO VALIDATION!
webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader)
if len(webAuthUser) > 0 {
user, err := store.GetUserByUsername(ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser)
if err != nil {
if !database.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
log.Error("Failed to get user by name: %v", err)
return nil, false, false
}
// Check if enabled auto-registration.
if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAutoRegistration {
// Creates new user with forged username!
user, err = store.CreateUser(
ctx.Req.Context(),
webAuthUser,
gouuid.NewV4().String()+"@localhost",
database.CreateUserOptions{
Activated: true,
},
)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to create user %q: %v", webAuthUser, err)
return nil, false, false
}
}
}
// Returns user as authenticated without any verification!
return user, false, false
}
}
// ... fallback to basic auth ...
}
// ...
}
The code has zero validation that:
The vulnerability occurs when:
0.0.0.0:3000)ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = trueGogs instance with the following configuration in custom/conf/app.ini:
[auth]
ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true
An attacker can impersonate any user including administrators:
# Become admin instantly
curl http://gogs.example.com/ -H "X-WEBAUTH-USER: <username>"
Add validation to ensure headers come from trusted sources:
func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) {
// ... existing code ...
if uid <= 0 {
if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication {
// Validate request is from trusted proxy
if !isRequestFromTrustedProxy(ctx.Req) {
log.Warn("Reverse proxy auth header received from untrusted source: %s", ctx.RemoteAddr())
return nil, false, false
}
webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader)
// ... rest of the code ...
}
}
// ...
}
// New validation function
func isRequestFromTrustedProxy(req *http.Request) bool {
// Check if request is from localhost/trusted IPs
remoteIP := getRemoteIP(req)
// Only accept from localhost by default
if remoteIP.IsLoopback() {
return true
}
// Check against configured trusted proxy IPs
for _, trustedIP := range conf.Auth.TrustedProxyIPs {
if remoteIP.String() == trustedIP {
return true
}
}
return false
}
Add configuration option:
[auth]
ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = false
REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_HEADER = X-WEBAUTH-USER
; Comma-separated list of trusted proxy IPs (default: 127.0.0.1)
TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS = 127.0.0.1,::1
; Whether to require trusted proxy validation (recommended: true)
REQUIRE_TRUSTED_PROXY = true