OSV 1.4.0 · github-reviewed · 修改于 2026-07-21 03:05
发布时间
2026-06-05 03:50
GitHub 审查时间
2026-06-05 03:50
NVD 发布时间
2026-07-16 01:16
源文件
advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-xgx4-4h9w-53pv/GHSA-xgx4-4h9w-53pv.json
This report covers the client-triggered DoQ forwarding path in:
dnsproxy v0.81.2 (adguard/dnsproxy:v0.81.2)AdGuard Home v0.107.74 (adguard/adguardhome:latest, image version label v0.107.74)The issue was reproduced on 2026-04-25 with the products configured through
their documented DoQ listener and plain UDP upstream surfaces. The scope is the
internal backend UDP hop created when a DoQ query is forwarded to a udp://
upstream.
On that path, the backend DNS ID is not preserved as an independent source of
entropy. For both products, the backend observer saw dns_id=0 for every
sampled client-triggered query on the tested path. Repeated reruns then showed
the same txid=0 behavior and the same positive source-port oracle on every
sampled run. A separate quoted-port ICMP oracle distinguished the correct
backend UDP source port from a wrong one with a stable, client-visible behavior
change.
Attached evidence:
dnsproxy oracle path on v0.81.2: attachments/artifacts/g03/20260425T141500Z-g03-v0812/summary.txtdnsproxy v0.81.2 repeatability: attachments/artifacts/g03/repeatability-v0812.mddnsproxy steering follow-up on v0.81.2: attachments/artifacts/g04/20260425T141900Z-g04-v0812/summary.txtAdGuard Home oracle path: attachments/artifacts/g05/20260425T113000Z-g05/summary.txtThe observable behavior is consistent across both products:
ID collapses to 0 on the
client-triggered path instead of remaining a fresh per-query variable.That combination removes txid from the backend tuple on the tested path and
leaves the UDP source port as the main remaining variable. In practical terms,
the backend hop stops behaving like a fresh (txid, source-port) pair per
forwarded query and instead becomes a one-variable state exposure.
For dnsproxy, the correct quoted port does more than produce a failure signal:
it can push resolution away from the primary UDP upstream and into the fallback
upstream. For AdGuard Home, the same condition produces a fast SERVFAIL.
Prerequisites:
The attached reproducer bundle contains only the files needed for this report:
attachments/scripts/attachments/docker/unbound-doq-attacker/attachments/docker-compose.g03.yml,
attachments/docker-compose.g04.yml, attachments/docker-compose.g05.ymlattachments/artifacts/...Build the helper image first:
cd attachmentsdocker build -t unbound-doq-attacker:latest -f docker/unbound-doq-attacker/Dockerfile docker/unbound-doq-attackerTo rerun dnsproxy:
cd attachmentsbash scripts/repro-g03-dnsproxy-oracle.shartifacts/g03/<RUN_ID>/summary.txtartifacts/g03/<RUN_ID>/entropy-backend.jsonl,
txid_correct-backend.jsonl, and port_correct-backend.jsonlTo rerun the dnsproxy fallback-steering case:
cd attachmentsbash scripts/repro-g04-dnsproxy-steering.shartifacts/g04/<RUN_ID>/summary.txtsteering_correct-main.jsonl and steering_correct-fallback.jsonlTo rerun AdGuard Home:
cd attachmentsbash scripts/repro-g05-adguardhome-oracle.shartifacts/g05/<RUN_ID>/summary.txtentropy-backend.jsonl, txid_correct-backend.jsonl, and
port_correct-backend.jsonlThe attached evidence includes fresh dnsproxy v0.81.2 reruns, one official-
profile AdGuard Home run, and the minimal reproducer bundle used by both.
For both products, the tested DoQ-to-UDP path is no longer a full
(txid, source-port) search surface:
dnsproxy: four of four sampled runs showed txid=0 on the backend hop and
a positive source-port oracle on v0.81.2. The remaining unknown is
port_only. Median wrong/correct port latency was 327.99 ms / 40.93 ms.AdGuard Home: four of four sampled runs showed txid=0 on the backend hop
and a positive source-port oracle. The aggregate again classifies the
remaining unknown as port_only. Median wrong/correct port latency was
319.14 ms / 37.02 ms.Product-specific effects:
dnsproxy: a correct port guess produced an empty client-visible answer on
the base oracle path, and in the fallback profile it steered all eight tested
queries away from the main upstream and into the fallback upstream.AdGuard Home: a correct port guess produced fast SERVFAIL and an extra
backend query.This is the security-relevant point. On the tested official profiles, the
backend hop no longer forces an off-path attacker to deal with two fresh random
fields per forwarded DNS race. The DNS ID is already known: it is
deterministically 0 on the client-triggered DoQ-to-UDP path. The only
remaining backend tuple variable is the UDP source port, and the attached
evidence shows a repeatable oracle for that remaining variable.
That places the path in the same threat-model class as oracle-assisted DNS
forgery work such as SAD DNS and TUdoor: the attack first uses an oracle to
learn or validate the tuple state that protects an off-path response race, and
only then attempts the forged response. This report stops short of a forgery
demo, but the evidence already shows the crucial precondition on the tested
backend hop: the tuple is not high-entropy anymore. It has been reduced from
(txid, source-port) to source-port only.
Attachments attachments.zip